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OF CHERRIES, FUDGE, AND ONIONS:
SCIENCE AND ITS COURTROOM
PERVERSION
DAVID W. PETERSON*  AND JOHN M. CONLEY**
I
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,1 General Electric Co. v. Joiner,2 and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael3
(the “Daubert trilogy”) redefine the duties of trial courts as arbiters of good sci-
entific evidence.4  Whereas under the venerable Frye test judges needed only to
hear that the evidence was generally accepted in the relevant scientific commu-
nity,5 they are now thrust into an active “gatekeeping” role.6  Above all, the
Daubert trilogy requires courts to recognize the scientific method.7  The legal
test for reliability of scientific evidence is whether it conforms to the scientific
method.8  Courts must scrutinize purportedly scientific evidence for specific in-
dicia of the scientific method; where these indicia are present, the evidence will
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1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
3. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
4. The specific effect of the Daubert trilogy has been to clarify the standard for admitting expert
testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  In response to the trilogy, Rules 701 to
703 have been amended, effective December 1, 2000.  See FED. R. EVID. 701-03.  Under the new Rule,
expert testimony on matters of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will now be admis-
sible “(1) if the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts
of the case.”  FED. R. EVID. 702.  The drafters of the new rule clearly believed that it was consistent
with the overall approach of the Daubert trilogy, although they chose not to codify any of the specific
Daubert reliability factors.  See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.  According to one mem-
ber of the Advisory Committee, “the amendments accurately codify and clarify the [Daubert trilogy]
tests for admission of scientific and technical evidence.”  Hugh B. Kaplan, Panel of Scholars Looks at
Daubert-Inspired Changes to Federal, Uniform Evidence Rules, 69 U.S.L.W. 2285, 2286 (Nov. 14, 2000)
(quoting Kenneth S. Broun).  This article proceeds on the assumption that the amended rules of evi-
dence will not change expert practice in any way that is material to our analysis.
5. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
6. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
7. See id. at 592-93.
8. See id.
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be deemed reliable.9  In other words, at least with respect to reliability, the law
should accept what science should accept.10
Although its nominal focus is on admissibility alone, the Daubert trilogy also
has profound implications for causation, in particular the relationship between
scientific and legal causation.  The purpose of the epistemological system that
we call the scientific method is to provide rules for deciding when evidence
counts—when it can be relied on to support a deduction about truth or an in-
ference about causation.11  The ultimate standards of truth and causation em-
ployed by science and law are very different, though both standards are
couched in terms of probabilities.  Science focuses on the specific probability of
the chance occurrence of a particular result, while the law speaks vaguely, ask-
ing whether proffered accounts of truth and causation are “more probable than
not” in a civil case, or are convincing “beyond a reasonable doubt” in a criminal
case.
Despite these differences, the Daubert trilogy has linked the two standards
inextricably, and the scientific method is the bridge.  The very existence of the
expert testimony controversy reflects the fact that, in many cases, a finding of
scientific causation will be highly material to the question of legal causation.
Indeed, in Daubert itself, a finding of legal causation could be based only on a
claim of scientific causation.12  In response to the question when purported evi-
dence of scientific causation is sufficiently reliable to be admitted in support of
legal causation, the Court answered: when it conforms to the scientific method.13
Thus, if a claim of scientific causation appears to be based on scientific method-
ology, then it can be translated into evidence of legal causation.
The Daubert cases assume that trial judges will be able to discern the scien-
tific method with reasonable accuracy.  Taking their duties seriously, trial
judges in Daubert jurisdictions have added a new term of art to the legal lexi-
con—the “Daubert hearing,” a voir dire examination of an expert to investigate
whether his or her methods were properly scientific.14  The resulting case law
suggests that these hearings are far from perfunctory, with much attempted
separation of wheat from chaff.15
9. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94.  Under Kumho, non-scientific expert testimony must meet a
more general test of reliability.  See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-50 (1999).
10. This is very different from saying that the law should accept what science does accept.  That
was the Frye standard.  In some cases, people who call themselves scientists, for example, forensic “sci-
entists,” accept what they should not, whereas in other cases, science has not yet had time to accept
things that it should and ultimately will.  See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE  8-10 (1997).
11. See generally David Goodstein, How Science Works, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 67 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000) (a physicist, writing for judges, compares the epis-
temological systems of law and science).
12. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582-84.
13. See id. at 592-94.
14. See William W. Schwarzer & Joe S. Cecil, Management of Expert Evidence, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 11, at 53-54.
15. This article will deal primarily with statistical evidence.  For examples of post-Daubert courts
giving intense scrutiny to statistical expert testimony in disparate contexts, see Wessman v. Gittens, 160
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The thesis of this article, however, is that Daubert’s focus on the scientific
method, however rigorously applied, invites certain classes of abuses.  Specifi-
cally, by moving courts from the Frye test’s concrete focus on general accep-
tance to a more abstract inquiry, the new standard may have opened the door to
evidentiary wolves in sheeps’ clothing: claims that have the external manifesta-
tions of science, but in fact do violence to core tenets of the scientific method.
Whereas Frye posed a fairly simple empirical question—do other experts say
that this “science” is generally acceptable?16—Daubert asks whether the evi-
dence has the attributes of science.17  These attributes are supposed to be scruti-
nized in a sophisticated way.18  But, as Joseph Sanders put it during the discus-
sion at the editorial conference for this symposium, a direct if unintended effect
of Daubert is that evidence that looks more scientific will more probably be
deemed admissible.19  There are instances in which evidence can be made to
look more scientific by a process that in fact and substance makes it utterly un-
scientific.  Indeed, the very process that creates the deceptively scientific evi-
dence may conceal the deception from everyone but its orchestrator.
Part II of this article begins with a description of the main tenets of the sci-
entific method, illustrated with reference to the ideal scientific experiment.  Our
example is a study conducted in the 1950s to determine the effectiveness of the
Salk vaccine in inhibiting polio in children.  Central to this discussion is a type
of probability called a p-value, a measure of the extent to which a body of em-
pirical evidence is consistent with a particular theory.  Part III describes in more
general terms the progression of a scientific inquiry, likening it to passage from
the outer layers of an onion toward its center.  Part IV identifies some of the
compromises necessary when applying scientific methods.
With these constructs established, Part V discusses some of the ways in
which the scientific method can be purposefully misapplied in civil litigation.20
Such misapplications undermine the reliability of the method and ultimately
distort scientific and legal judgments about causation.  We describe how,
through a process of “fudging” an investigation and “cherrypicking” results, one
can produce scientific-looking evidence for presentation in court that is, in fact,
not scientific at all.  More troubling is that, by controlling the information and
assignments given to various experts, a party can ensure that the testifying ex-
pert is unaware that the testimony he or she gives is unreliable.  Most disturbing
F.3d 790, 802-05 (1st Cir. 1998) (school desegregation); City of Tuscaloosa v. Hacros Chem., Inc., 158
F.3d 548, 562-67 (11th Cir. 1998) (price-fixing and bid-rigging); Coward v. ADT Sec. Sys., 140 F.3d 271,
274-75 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (employment discrimination); In re Executive Telecard Ltd. Sec. Litig., 979 F.
Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (securities damages).
16. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
17. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94.
18. Cf. id. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; questioning the
ability of federal judges to function as “amateur scientists”).
19. See infra note 112.
20. The Federal Rules of Evidence, as interpreted in the Daubert trilogy, apply to both civil and
criminal cases.  We limit our analysis to civil contexts, however, because that is where our experience
and expertise lie.
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of all, there does not appear to be any mechanism within the current rules of
civil discovery ensuring that such abuses come to the attention of either the op-
posing party or the court.21  Part VI proposes reforms to those rules.
II
A SCIENTIFIC IDEAL: THE DESIGNED EXPERIMENT
A. The Salk Vaccine Trials
As of the early 1950s, the poliomyelitis virus was a scourge of America’s
children; hundreds of thousands were afflicted, and many were disabled for
life.22  Among several vaccines under development, the one produced by Dr.
Jonas Salk showed considerable promise.23  The United States Public Health
Service decided to conduct a very large-scale experiment to determine its effec-
tiveness.24  Ultimately, about two million school children were involved in the
tests, though only a fraction of them actually received the vaccine.25
In designing the experiment, the Public Health Service attempted to take
account of a variety of special considerations.26  The first was the nature of the
disease itself.27  Polio is a hygiene-related disease: children who live in unhy-
gienic environments are more likely to contract polio than those who live in
cleaner environments.28  Perversely, it is the latter children who are most se-
verely affected when they do contract the disease;29 the former are likely to be
exposed early to the polio virus, so they tend to suffer only mildly and to de-
velop an immunity to further harm.30  Polio is also contagious, so that if one sec-
ond-grader is infected, there is an increased chance that his or her classmates
will be infected.31  Furthermore, polio is epidemic, so the incidence is much
greater in some years than in others.32
Second, there were ethical and technical considerations distinct from the na-
ture of the disease.  Clearly, one could not ethically require that any particular
child be vaccinated with the experimental vaccine without permission from the
child’s parents or guardian.33  But it is possible that children whose parents
would grant permission would differ in some material and systematic ways from
21. Once again, criminal cases are beyond the scope of this article.  In general, expert discovery is
considerably narrower in criminal cases.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E) & (b)(1)(C) (granting lim-
ited right to obtain written summary of expert testimony to be presented).
22. See DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 3 (2d ed. 1991).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 4.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 5.
32. See id. at 4.
33. See id.
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children whose parents would withhold permission.34  For example, it might be
that well-educated and relatively affluent parents would tend to grant permis-
sion, while less well-educated and less affluent parents would not.35  A potential
result is that relatively many children living in hygienic circumstances would be
permitted to take part in the study, and relatively few of those living in less hy-
gienic conditions.36  This imbalance could seriously skew the results of the
study.37
There is also the problem that the behavior of the child or the parents might
be influenced by the fact that the child had been vaccinated.38  A child thus pro-
tected need not be quite as cautious in avoiding possible exposure to polio, and
therefore might tend to engage in riskier behavior than his non-vaccinated
neighbor.  This too could seriously distort the study results.  Moreover, since
polio comes in both mild and severe forms, it is not always clear whether a child
has contracted the virus.39  As a result, a clinician examining a child who had
been vaccinated might be less inclined to diagnose polio for that child than for
her unvaccinated neighbor.40
Sorting through this web of considerations, the Public Health Service de-
cided upon the following course of action.  First, it selected schools across the
nation where the incidence of polio was relatively high.41  It then sought the
permission of parents of first, second, and third graders for their children to be
vaccinated as part of the study.42  Half of the participating children were se-
lected at random and injected with the Salk vaccine.43  The other half of the
subjects were injected with a placebo, a saline solution designed to have no
medical effect whatsoever.44  The children and guardians did not know whether
a child received the vaccine or the placebo.45  All of the children—both those
who received the Salk vaccine and those who received the placebo—were moni-
tored over the ensuing months by clinicians who also were not told which of the
children had received which treatment.46
An experiment of this sort is termed randomized and double-blind.47  It is
randomized because the choice of whom to give the real vaccine is made by the
toss of a coin or some other equally detached chance process.48  This process vir-
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 5.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 4.
42. See id. at 4-5.
43. See id. at 5.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
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tually guarantees that there will be no systematic difference between the group
of children given the real vaccine and those who are given the false vaccine.49  It
is blind in the first instance because the children and their parents are unaware
of whether they have actually been vaccinated.50  Consequently, there is virtu-
ally no chance that the vaccinated children, as a group, will behave any differ-
ently from those who were given the false vaccine.51  It is blind in the second in-
stance because the people evaluating the health of the children do not know
which of their subjects received the Salk vaccine and which received the pla-
cebo.52  As a result, it is virtually certain that the same methods and standards
for diagnosis will be used for the vaccinated group as for the placebo group.
In all, about 200,000 students received the Salk vaccine and about 200,000
received the placebo in this phase of the experiment.53  The incidence of polio
among the vaccinated group was approximately twenty-eight cases per 100,000,
while that among the placebo group was about seventy-one cases per 100,000.54
Given the randomized, double-blind construction of this experiment, there are
only two possible explanations for these results.55  The first is that the Salk vac-
cine really differed from the placebo in its effect on polio and that the differ-
ence was in the direction of reducing polio.56  The second is that the Salk vaccine
was no different from the placebo in its effect on polio, and that the observed
reduction in the incidence in polio was due solely to the manner in which chil-
dren were assigned to the treatment groups.57  In other words, the children who
contracted polio were destined to get it regardless of their treatment and the
fact that most of them were placed in the group given the placebo was due
purely to the luck of the coin toss.
B. The p-Value
Part of the genius of this experimental design is that one can calculate the
probability that, if indeed the Salk vaccine were identical to the placebo in its
effect on the polio virus, the coin toss mechanism would result in so many of the
children predestined to contract polio being assigned to the placebo group.58
That probability is about one in a billion.59  Thus, it seems safe to say that the
difference in the incidence of polio between the Salk group and the placebo
group cannot reasonably be attributed to the random assignment of children to
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 6.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 7.
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treatment and placebo groups.  The only remaining possibility is that the differ-
ence was caused by the greater effectiveness of the Salk vaccine.60
The above probability is called a p-value; it is a standard component of a re-
port of the results of a scientific experiment.  Assuming the truth of what is
called the “null hypothesis,” a p-value is the probability that evidence would
arise that contradicts the null hypothesis at least as strongly as the evidence at
hand contradicts it.61  In the present case, the null hypothesis has two compo-
nents: (1) that certain children were predestined to contract polio regardless of
treatment, and the vaccine had no more effect than the placebo; and (2) that
each child was assigned to either the Salk group or the placebo group based on
the outcome of a random process.  The evidence here is that the incidence of
polio in the former group was twenty-eight per 100,000 and, in the latter, sev-
enty-one per 100,000.  The p-value is the probability, assuming no difference in
efficacy between the placebo and the vaccine, that the random assignment pro-
cess alone would produce a disparity in polio rates as great or greater than that
which actually was observed.
A small p-value indicates that the observed data are inconsistent with the
null hypothesis—the smaller the p-value, the greater the inconsistency.  Hence,
a small p-value is evidence that the null hypothesis is not true.  If the experi-
ment has been ideally constructed, rejection of this hypothesis will leave but
one alternative.  In the Salk case, the minuscule p-value (one in a billion)62
would lead the researchers to reject the null hypothesis that the coin-toss as-
signment process—that is, chance alone—accounted for the disparity in polio
rates between the two groups.  Given the structure of the experiment, there is
only one other plausible explanation: that the Salk vaccine was effective.
This is the logic of the ideal scientific experiment.  The design features of
random assignment and double-blinding virtually rule out the possibility of sys-
tematic differences between the experimental and control groups other than
exposure to the suspected causal agent.  When a very low p-value indicates that
chance is too unlikely an explanation for an observed disparity in outcomes, the
only alternative is to conclude that the agent’s causal effect is real.
The problem is that few questions, scientific or otherwise, can be settled
with the elegant finality of the Salk trials.  This is particularly true in legal con-
texts, where the evidence is almost never so neat.  In many instances, logistical
or ethical barriers preclude a true experiment.  Researchers are relegated to un-
controlled observational studies or after-the-fact data analysis.  In all such cases,
the focus on the suspected causal agent can never be as sharp as in the ideal,
well-designed experiment.
60. This is because, given the random division of participants into the vaccine and placebo groups,
there is no basis to suspect any systematic differences between the groups other than exposure or non-
exposure to the vaccine.
61. See David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 14, at 83, 122.
62. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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These situations have proved to be particularly troubling for courts under
the Daubert regime.  When the only scientific evidence of causation falls short
of the Salk trials’ gold standard, as it does in most cases, does it comport suffi-
ciently with the scientific method to be admissible?  That is, is it sufficiently re-
liable to be translated into legal causation?  This is precisely the question that
troubled the courts that heard the Daubert case itself as they wrestled with the
issue of whether Bendectin could be reliably shown to cause birth defects.63
Our focus is somewhat different, however.  In cases like Daubert, it is ap-
parent to the court that the scientific evidence of causation falls short of the
ideal, and the question becomes what to do with the second-best.  In other
cases, though, the evidence may appear far neater than it really is, in ways that
are often invisible to the court and even to the adversary.  Null hypotheses are
assumed, ostensibly robust p-values are calculated, and causal agents—for ex-
ample, discriminating employers or conspiring competitors—are scrutinized.
The problem here is not what to do with inferior evidence, but rather how to
discover that it is inferior.  We turn next to an analysis of several such situa-
tions.
III
THE PROBLEM OF DISCERNING SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS: PEELING AN ONION
The first problematic category involves sorting out pieces of evidence that
appear to be equally scientific, but in fact present quite different approxima-
tions of the truth in which a court is interested.  Consider the historical record
of a scientific inquiry that has not been driven by litigation.  This record will be
characterized by multiple analyses that seek the underlying truth in varying
ways.  Each analysis may, standing alone, be reasonable and thoroughly scien-
tific.  In hindsight, it will be easy to delineate progress and to identify false starts
and blind alleys.  But take away the historical perspective and consider all the
different analyses simultaneously, without knowing in advance which will ulti-
mately prove to be correct.64  A vigorous advocate presents each analysis and at-
tacks the others with equal vigor.  The evaluation process is now infinitely
harder.  This is precisely the dilemma in which courts often find themselves as
they try to create order out of competing hypotheses.
Consider the analogy of an onion.  A scientific inquiry can be likened to
peeling away the layers of an onion.  At the center of the onion lies the truth
being sought.  Depending on where we are in the peeling process, we can ex-
amine and comprehend only some outer layers of the onion.  Our knowledge of
what lies further inside is merely inferential.  With more investigation, we can
63. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
64. To take a famous example, if one reads the history of Michael Ventris’s deciphering of the Lin-
ear B tablets from Homeric Greece, it is easy to see why his approach worked and those who came be-
fore him failed.  See JOHN CHADWICK, THE DECIPHERMENT OF LINEAR B (2d ed. 1992).  But imagine
having to evaluate all the different approaches at once, without knowing in advance which one was
right.  This is the situation in which courts often find themselves.
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peel away layers and progress toward the center.  Realistically, however, there
is little hope of ever clearly laying bare the very center.  Our inferences about
what lies there are based on what can be learned from some intermediate layer,
and the closer that layer is to the center, the more reliable the inferences.
A scientific inquiry progresses toward the center of its onion by successive
refinement. These refinements may involve greater measurement precision, as
in the use of atomic clocks instead of stop watches, the use of micrometers in-
stead of foot rulers, or the use of a nationally drawn sample instead of a few
clinical cases.  They may involve increased controls, such as accounting for dif-
ferences in age, college, and major when comparing the salaries of men and
women in the civilian labor force.  They also may involve successively more
elaborate and realistic theories, as when scientists try to explain phenomena
relating the mass, energy, and motion of subatomic particles.65
The questions facing a judge often go well beyond whether a proffered piece
of evidence is nominally scientific.  Its attributes may be undeniably scientific,
but what layer did it come from?  Is that layer closer to the center of the onion
than other competing evidence?  Even if it is closer, is it still so far from the ul-
timate truth being sought that it is too unreliable or too marginally relevant to
be admissible?  And even if admissible, does it deserve any significant weight?66
Consider, for example, a situation in which an employer is accused of gen-
der-based salary discrimination.  Suppose that this employer’s jobs do not carry
fixed pay rates, and that among people holding the same job title, people are
paid at various rates that may or may not be justified by differences in their
seniority, proficiency, or dependability.  Suppose further that the numbers of
employees involved, their average pay rates, and their departmental and job ti-
tle affiliations are as shown in Table 1.
65. See Goodstein, supra note 11, at 72-74.
66. For a sophisticated analysis of the admissibility versus the weight of complex statistical analysis,
see Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986) (citation omitted):
While the omission of variables from a regression analysis may render the analysis less proba-
tive than it otherwise might be, it can hardly be said, absent some other infirmity, that an
analysis which accounts for the major factors ‘must be considered unacceptable as evidence of
discrimination.’  Normally, failure to include variables will affect the analysis’ probativeness,
not its admissibility.
It is an interesting conceptual question whether evidence that passes the Daubert test of reli-
ability and relevance can be held to be so insignificant that its proponent can still lose on summary
judgment.  See John M. Conley & David W. Peterson, The Science of Gatekeeping: The Federal Judicial
Center’s New Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1183, 1199 & n.10 (1996).
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TABLE 1:
WEEKLY PAY DATA
Dept A Dept B Combined
Avg $ # Emps Avg $ # Emps Avg $ # Emps
Male 360 5 432 5 396 10
Job 1
Female 360 10 432 5 384 15
Male 540 5 648 5 594 10
Job 2
Female 540 20 648 10 576 30
Male 450 10 540 10 495 20
Combined
Female 480 30 576 15 512 45
From the data in Table 1, we can make the following comparisons between
the average compensation of men and women:
a) Overall, women are paid more than men.
b) Men in Job 1 are paid more than women in Job 1; Men in Job 2
are paid more than women in Job 2.
c) Women in Dept. A are paid more than men in Dept. A; Women
in Dept. B are paid more than men in Dept. B.
d) Within each job and department, men are paid the same as
women.
Analysis 1: The plaintiff begins with generalized allegations that there are
gender disparities in compensation, and that these disparities are caused by em-
ployer discrimination.  These allegations frame the issue at the center of the
onion: whether the employer really is discriminating against women.  In an ini-
tial response, the employer might point out that, on average, its forty-five fe-
male employees are paid $512 per week, which is more than the average pay
($495 per week) of its twenty male employees.  This statistic is “scientific” in a
primitive way:  Its arithmetic is reliable, and averages are a staple of statistical
investigation.  Nor is it entirely irrelevant, because it says something about how
the employer treats women.  It does not strike very close to the heart of the
onion, however, because there is little assurance that it compares females to
similarly situated males.  Indeed, it blurs job title distinctions, departmental af-
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filiation distinctions, and whatever distinctions may exist with respect to senior-
ity, proficiency, and dependability.
Analysis 2:  The plaintiff might then point out that the ten males holding Job
1 are paid more, on average, than the fifteen females holding Job 1 ($396 versus
$384) and that, likewise, the ten males holding Job 2 are paid more on average
than the thirty females holding Job 2 ($594 versus $576).  Clearly, this comes
closer to comparing female workers with similarly situated males than does the
comparison first offered by the employer.  We have progressed toward the cen-
ter of the onion in a way that requires no special scientific sophistication; it is
the sort of judgment that courts routinely make in employment discrimination
cases.67  Given the enhanced nexus between the plaintiff’s method of compari-
son and the ultimate issue, one must discard the employer’s comparison in favor
of the plaintiff’s.  It would be folly to credit both equally, and worse to accept
that of the employer over that of the plaintiff.
Analysis 3:  The employer might then parry the plaintiff’s thrust with the ob-
servation that the thirty females in Department A are paid more, on average,
than the ten males in that department  ($480 versus $450) and, likewise, that the
fifteen females in Department B are paid more on average than the ten males
($576 versus  $540).  This too is closer to the center of the onion than is the em-
ployer’s first comparison, but it is not obviously closer than the plaintiff’s com-
parison—it is merely different.  Both plaintiff and defendant have now im-
proved on the employer’s first comparison, but neither of these new analyses is
clearly more probative than the other.  They lie at two separate points on the
same layer of the onion.
Analysis 4:  To repel the plaintiff’s initiative, the employer must plunge
deeper into the onion.  It can do so by showing that within Department A,
women in both Job 1 ($360) and Job 2 ($540) are paid exactly the same, on av-
erage, as are men, and that the same is true for each of the two jobs in Depart-
ment B.  This comparison is a refinement of that offered by the plaintiff in
Analysis 3, because it is closer to the question of whether the employer pays
similarly situated women and men the same.  Most would probably conclude
that, with this analysis, the defendant has trumped the plaintiff’s analysis by
striking closest to the ultimate issue with favorable results.68
67. For examples of courts making this sort of judgment, see Ingram v. NWS, Inc., No. 92 C 8339,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17190, at *27-30 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 1997) (concluding that plaintiff’s statistics
were not based on sound methodology, because the statistician did not necessarily isolate age from re-
lated but non-discriminatory factors, such as seniority, as a deciding factor in employment decisions,
and because the statistician did not exclude from the data pool those employees who did not meet ob-
jective minimum requirements); Contractors Ass’n. of Eastern Pa., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 893 F.
Supp. 419, 427-31 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding that the plaintiffs’ statistician’s “disparity index” was not suf-
ficient to prove that discrimination took place because, while it indicated disparities in minority hiring,
it did not rule out “several neutral explanations for [the] statistical disparities,” and his study was
“methodologically flawed” in part because he did not make sure that the contractors in his data pool
were all “qualified, willing, and able” to perform the available jobs).
68. This depends on the theory of discrimination being pursued.  If, as we assume here, the allega-
tion is that, among employees performing the same tasks, the employer pays women less than it does
men at least in part because of their gender, then the defendant has moved closer to the center of the
CONLEY_FMT.DOC 06/04/01  1:31 PM
224 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 64: No. 4
This series of relatively simple analyses could vex a court on multiple levels.
In light of the subsequent analyses, Analysis 1 is deceptively simplistic.  But in
some sense it is scientific, so do its drawbacks render it inadmissible?  As illus-
trated above, Analysis 4 gets us significantly closer to the center of the onion
than any of the other three; does its superiority make its competitors inadmissi-
ble?  Keep in mind the consequences of admitting a flawed analysis.  In a bench
trial, these consequences are minimal, since the too-generous gatekeeper, now
the fact-finder, can simply ignore that analysis in favor of a superior competitor.
But if a jury ultimately credits an analysis that the gatekeeper-judge found mar-
ginally admissible though unimpressive, the judge’s only recourse is to upset the
verdict on the grounds that the analysis was (1) a reliable exemplar of the scien-
tific method; (2) relevant to the issue at the core of the onion; but (3) for some
other reason not good enough evidence on which to base a verdict.
As difficult as it might be for a court to make legal sense of the apparent sci-
entific progression of the above analyses, an even greater problem is introduced
by the consideration of analyses that have not been done or put before the
court.  The above analyses are, in reality, a sample of a potentially infinite set of
analyses of the discrimination question.  Recall that Analysis 1 began to look
meaningless only in light of Analyses 2 and 3, and that they, in turn, seemed in-
adequate only in the reflected light of Analysis 4.  But are there other possible
analyses (5, 6, 7 . . . n) that would similarly reveal the inadequacies of Analysis
4?  A litigant might never have thought of such analyses; she might have
thought of them but left them undone for tactical reasons; or she might have
conducted them but buried the results.  Do Daubert gatekeepers need to worry
about these contingencies, or should the contingencies even concern the legal
system at large?  We return to these issues at the end of the article.
IV
THE PROBLEM OF NO DESIGN
A related problem is that the data that become the subject of analysis in liti-
gation—such as the analyses in the preceding section—are seldom the product
of any research design.  The ideally designed experiment is rarely achieved out-
side of a laboratory setting or a formal inquiry like that involving the Salk vac-
cine.  In litigation, one must accept what is available.  This messy reality greatly
complicates the ability to recognize the scientific method and its appropriate
application.
Consider, for example, a situation in which it is alleged that an employer,
forced by an economic downturn to lay off workers, terminated older employ-
ees when choosing among otherwise similar individuals.  The raw empirical evi-
onion than the plaintiff.  If, however, the allegation is that the employer disadvantages women by as-
signing them to less well-paid “slots”—job or department combinations—than men, then the defen-
dant’s “progress” into the onion is nothing more than a sideslip along its surface.  See, e.g., Valentino v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 69, 71 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (discussing statistical implications of dis-
crimination in slotting employees into job groups).
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dence consists of a list of employees as of the day before the force reduction,
indicating their names, job titles, hire dates, birth dates, departmental affilia-
tions, and an indication of whether that person was laid off the next day.  These
data were not generated pursuant to an experimental design; they are simply a
more or less complete record of what happened.  In using such data to deter-
mine whether the employer took account of age to the disadvantage of older
employees, one usually attempts to identify all of the groups of employees who
were similarly situated just prior to the layoff.  “Similarly situated” is defined in
terms of the information available about the individual employees that would
be reasonable and appropriate to consider when making termination deci-
sions—perhaps job title, department, and seniority, but not age.  The employer
might never have constructed such groupings, but our analysis will assume that
it should have.  Our objective is to determine what alternatives were reasonably
available to the employer at the time it made its selections.  If the employer
consistently chose older employees for termination relative to the reasonably
available alternatives, the inference is raised that it made impermissible use of
age in making those selections.
More specifically, the analysis presumes that, within a group of similarly
situated employees, all were or should have been considered equally acceptable
alternative candidates for termination.  If there are ten people in the group and
one of them was in fact terminated, the presumption is that there were nine
equally plausible alternatives to that choice.
With these assumptions in place, we can now determine whether the age
pattern of the employees who were actually terminated deviated substantially
from what might have been expected on the basis of chance alone.  If older em-
ployees were terminated at a higher rate than their younger counterparts, but
the discrepancy could be reasonably attributed to chance, one should not infer
discrimination.  Making this judgment requires the calculation of a p-value.
To calculate the p-value for the pattern of actual terminations, one assumes
that the employer selected people for termination completely at random from
each group of similarly situated employees.  Thus, in the group of ten employ-
ees, one of whom was terminated, each member would have had one chance in
ten of being terminated.  Had there been two people terminated from that
group, each member would be presumed to have had two chances in ten of be-
ing selected; had there been no terminations, all members would be considered
to have been immune from selection.  Building up from this premise and work-
ing group-by-group, one calculates an overall p-value for the actual pattern of
terminations.  This p-value measures the extent to which the actual pattern is
consistent with the null hypothesis that selections were made randomly within
each group of similarly situated employees.
In reality, employers rarely make termination decisions based on random
selection; there is nearly always some marginal consideration that will break a
tie between otherwise similar candidates for layoff.  The consideration may be
as subjective as a good work attitude or a pleasing personality, or as objective as
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regularity of attendance—or, invidiously, age—but it is almost never the case
that the final choice comes down to the toss of a coin.  In contrast, the coin-toss
mechanism was explicitly built into the Salk vaccine trials; it was a critical part
of the experimental design, and the feature that permitted the calculation of a
p-value.
In analyzing the employer’s layoff record, we start with a hypothesis that is
highly implausible, and then check to see whether the employer’s record con-
tradicts it.  If a small p-value results, we conclude that the employer did not
make selections at random from the groups of similarly situated employees, and
that, therefore, some other process must have been used.  Note that, unlike the
Salk vaccine situation, many possible alternative processes remain.  Perhaps the
employer selected employees based on height; perhaps it was their personali-
ties; perhaps it was their ages after all.  The statistical analysis rules out only the
implausible hypothesis that the employer, working with groups structured in the
manner described, selected people for termination randomly from these groups.
In this application, we adopt the form of the designed experiment without
its substance.  Why does one have any interest in determining whether the age
pattern of terminations is consistent with a hypothesis known at the outset to be
highly implausible?  First, in practice, there is a need to distinguish minor age
disparities between those terminated and those retained from disparities that
are so large as to suggest that the employer may have used age as a factor in
terminating people.  Second, this adaptation of the designed experiment pro-
duces results that are plausible, even though the underlying assumptions are
not.
Suppose, for example, that calculations based on the implausible model
yield the following results: (1) 24.3 people over age forty would have been ter-
minated if the ages of people terminated had been perfectly representative of
the ages of all those eligible for termination; and (2) between twenty and
twenty-eight people over age forty would have been terminated if employees
had been randomly selected from each peer group.69  If the employer in fact
terminated twenty-seven people over age forty, then there is no statistical indi-
cation here that older people were systematically singled out for termination.
That is, even though the perfect parity figure of 24.3 may be erroneous  because
of errors made in forming the groups of “similarly situated” employees, the
model provides for reasonable departures from parity, departures considered to
be innocuous.  The possibility of age discrimination becomes plausible only if
the employer terminated a number of people over age forty that is significantly
different from the model’s perfect parity figure or, in this case, outside the
range of twenty to twenty-eight.70
69. These results mean that the termination patterns for which the p-values are not too small (for
example, not less than 0.05) are those for which the number of terminated employees over age 40 is in
the range of  20 to 28.
70. It may seem odd that, having pointed out the implausibility of the statistical model, we cite as
its redeeming feature the fact that it does not predict very exactly the number of people of each age
who will be terminated.  A more logical approach to this situation would begin by quantifying the de-
CONLEY_FMT.DOC 06/04/01  1:31 PM
Page 213:  Autumn 2001]  SCIENCE AND ITS COURTROOM PERVERSION 227
For all its imperfections, this approach leads to a qualitatively reasonable re-
sult, even though it is not a product of a designed experiment.  There is a range
of values within which the employer’s record may fall without raising an infer-
ence of discrimination, because chance alone is a sufficient explanation.  A rec-
ord outside that range, however, demands a non-chance explanation.  Because
the “design” falls far short of the Salk model, we are not drawn inescapably to
the suspect variable—age—but we may now at least entertain the possibility
that age was a factor in the selection process.
Making sense of this chain of reasoning may be daunting to a judge charged
with deciding if it adds up to “science.”  At first, that judge might be cautious,
because the data seem so unsystematic, so far removed from the Salk model of
collection.  But the judge is then told that there is a way to construct an experi-
ment of sorts, a decent approximation of the Salk model, directed at the ques-
tion of whether the employer engaged in age discrimination.  The very next
piece of information, though, is that this quasi-experiment will test a hypothesis
that is counterintuitive and almost certainly counterfactual.  Why bother?  Why
is the law interested in a test of the self-evidently false proposition that the em-
ployer terminated people at random?
The answer is that, given the available information, this appears to be the
only way to begin to shed scientific light on whether employer discrimination
caused the observed pattern of terminations.  This analysis will not prove that
discrimination caused the pattern, but it may effectively rule out chance as a
cause.  In this sense, the analysis is quite modest.  But by opening or closing the
door to consideration of the universe of non-chance factors that includes age
discrimination, it is highly relevant, indeed essential, to deciding the ultimate
legal issue.  Therefore, a judge should conclude that the analysis is scientifically
reliable and relevant, but only with respect to a narrow, yet vital, question.  As
the preceding discussion should suggest, reaching this conclusion will test the
subtlety and patience of even the most diligent gatekeeper.
V
PROBLEMS WITH HIDDEN EVIDENCE
A. Cherrypicking: When a p-Value Is Not a p-Value
Another problem involves what we think of as deceptive p-values: probabili-
ties that have the formal attributes of p-values, but in fact misstate the signifi-
cance of the results they appear to support.  In a recent article written for an
economics audience, Judge Richard Posner illustrated the problem by reference
to what he termed “witness shopping”:
gree to which the model itself is flawed, and then tracing the effects of these flaws.  But there is no prac-
tical way of doing this in many instances, while the method suggested in the text is both practical and,
within limits, plausible.
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Suppose that the lawyer for the plaintiff hired the first economist whom he inter-
viewed and the lawyer for the defendant hired the 20th economist whom she inter-
viewed.  The inference is that the defendant’s economic case is weaker than the plain-
tiff’s.  The parallel is to conducting 20 statistical tests of a hypothesis and reporting, as
significant at the 5 percent level, the only one that supported the hypothesis.71
To take a more detailed look at Posner’s problem, suppose that a drug
manufacturer advertises that its new pain medication, R2-5, is more effective
than aspirin in providing quick relief from minor aches and pains.  Such a claim
should, of course, be backed up by a scientific experiment proving that fact.
One could design such an experiment along the lines of the Salk vaccine ex-
periment by randomly dividing people into two groups, one that is treated with
R2-5 and the other that is treated with aspirin.  When the subjects have been
evaluated and the results tallied, a p-value can be calculated based on the ran-
dom assignment process.
Based more on tradition than rational principle, users of statistical reasoning
generally regard p-values of less than .05 (or five percent) as “statistically sig-
nificant,” an indication that the observed data are sufficiently inconsistent with
the hypothesis of chance occurrence as to require a search for some alternative
explanation.  Assume that, in fact, R2-5 is neither more nor less effective than
aspirin.  There is still a five percent probability that the experiment designed to
compare its effectiveness with that of aspirin will produce a p-value less than
.05.  This means that even if R2-5’s effects are identical to those of aspirin, there
is a one-in-twenty chance that the experiment will indicate otherwise.
Suppose now that the drug manufacturer were to commission two inde-
pendent studies of the effectiveness of R2-5 to be done by two different re-
search organizations.  There is a ninety-five percent chance that the first organi-
zation’s study will show no significant difference between R2-5 and aspirin.
Likewise there is a ninety-five percent chance that the second organization’s
study will show no difference.  But there is only a ninety-five percent of ninety-
five percent chance—that is, a 90.25% chance—that both organizations’ studies
will show no significant difference.  Thus, there is a 100% - 90.25% = 9.75%
chance that at least one of the two studies will indicate that R2-5 is more effec-
tive than aspirin, even though the two drugs are equally effective.  If the studies
are independent and neither of the two research organizations is aware of the
work of the other, there is an approximately one-in-ten chance that at least one
of them will conclude that R2-5 is more effective than aspirin.  The drug manu-
facturer might then cite such a study in support of its advertising claim, pur-
posefully omitting mention of any study reaching a contrary conclusion.
The odds that this scheme will succeed can be vastly improved by hiring ten
independent organizations to do ten independent studies.  Under these condi-
tions, chances rise to about four in ten that at least one will indicate that R2-5 is
significantly more effective than aspirin, even though there is no difference at
71. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness, 13 J. ECON.
PERSP. 91, 98 (1999).
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all.72  If the drug manufacturer bases its advertising campaign on just the one re-
port among ten that was most favorable to it, the campaign overstates its case.73
The p-value associated with that one report does not take account of the
other nine studies, or the fact that the one study selected for publication was
selected precisely because it was the most favorable.  The organization produc-
ing this particular study is blameless, assuming it has no knowledge of the stud-
ies of its sister institutions.  It might have conducted an entirely proper and ob-
jective study, and there is no reason it should not be willing to stand by its
results, even to the point of providing sworn testimony.  Each of the other nine
research organizations might be surprised to learn that R2-5 has been shown to
be more effective than aspirin, but each will realize that it apparently does not
know all the results of all tests that were performed.  Upon learning of the con-
trary result, each organization will probably conclude that, if it had done its
studies differently or with more subjects, it too would have been able to detect
at least some differences, however slight, in the effects of R2-5 and aspirin.  In
sum, the only party who may fully appreciate the knavery of this exercise may
be its orchestrator.  To all other parties, it will appear that R2-5 is a scientifi-
cally confirmed improvement on aspirin.
Apply this same type of thinking to an employer who has employees in each
of the following nine job categories: (1) managers and administrators, (2) pro-
fessionals, (3) salespersons, (4) technicians, (5) clerical workers, (6) craft work-
ers, (7) operatives, (8) laborers, and (9) service workers.74  Suppose that, within
each category, the employer monitors the promotion rates of men versus
women and minorities versus non-minorities and expresses the differences in
promotion rates as p-values.  Thus, there are nine p-values reflecting promotion
rate differences by gender, and nine others reflecting promotion rate differ-
ences by race.  Recall that a non-discriminating employer will produce a p-value
less than or equal to five percent about five percent of the time.  There are
many chances here for at least one of the eighteen p-values to be less than five
percent and, hence, to be considered statistically significant.  Indeed, if the
eighteen p-values are independent of one another—which may or may not be
true, depending on how closely employee race and gender are correlated—
there is only a 39.7% probability that all eighteen p-values will be greater than
five percent.  Therefore, it is more likely than not that a non-discriminating em-
ployer will have at least one job category in which there appears to be a statisti-
cally significant disparity in promotion rates by race or gender.75
72. The probability that all ten organizations’ studies will be insignificant at the five percent level is
0.95 raised to the tenth power, or 0.599.  Hence, the probability that at least one of the organizations
will produce a study demonstrating that R2-5 is more effective than aspirin is 0.401, or about four
chances in ten.
73. This is true regardless of whether R2-5 is more effective than aspirin.
74. These job categories are commonly used by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion in auditing the employment practices of employers.
75. Since, by definition, this sort of cherrypicking is difficult to detect, reported instances in the
case law are rare.  Nonetheless, the example in the text is generally analogous to the age discrimination
case of Ingram v. NWS, Inc., No. 92 C 8339, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17190 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 1997),
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Suppose now that a federal agency focuses solely on the most egregious of
these eighteen disparities and brings to a court’s attention the fact that, among,
say, craft workers, women received statistically significantly less than their pro-
portionate share of promotions last year.  The p-value cited by the agency for
this group is not the true p-value, because it does not take into account the fact
that the job category was selected precisely because it has the largest disparity.
A proper characterization of the evidence that this employer discriminated
would take into account not only the particular p-value cited by the agency, but
also all of the others it reviewed.
The above examples involve picking from among a collection of more or less
independent comparisons that one that best comports with one’s views.  We call
this behavior “cherrypicking.”  It involves surveying several bodies of data and
choosing to credit only those which produce the “right” answer for no reason
other than the fact that they do so.
B. Fudging the Analysis: Another Path Around the Onion
A variation on “cherrypicking” is called “fudging the analysis.”76  “Fudging
the analysis,” however, involves applying a variety of different analyses to the
same, fixed body of data.  The result of each analysis is deemed credible based
on the extent to which it is favorable to the party’s views.  In this process, little
or no thought is given to progressing toward the center of the onion.
Consider the case of an employer who laid off twenty employees in a force
reduction.  The plaintiff, age fifty-four at the time, compiles statistics showing
that a disproportionate number of employees older than fifty-one were among
those laid off.  Defendant employer counters with the observation that the lay-
off rate of people over the age of forty-two is identical to that of people under
age forty-two.  If the plaintiff has run his calculations using age cutoffs of forty,
forty-one, forty-two, and so forth, and then reported only the result most favor-
able to him, then his report distorts the evidence, unless he discloses the fact
that other cutoffs were examined and found to be inferior, or unless he adjusts
his reported p-value to take full account of this fact.  The same principle applies
as well to the defendant’s calculations. 77
where the court criticized an expert statistician for the exclusion of certain job group data that would
have tended to undercut his party’s position.  See id. at *32.  The court required modifications to the
expert’s analysis before it would allow his testimony.  See id. at *40.  In another age discrimination case,
Adams v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1100-03 (S.D. Ind. 1998), the court made
similar criticisms of a statistician, noting as well that his data selection had been influenced by counsel.
See also Garrett v. Kenmore Mercy Hosp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2132, at *17-23 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)
(deeming statistical study inadmissible in part because expert selected data in reliance on client’s direc-
tion); Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 893 F. Supp. 419, 431-33 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(same).
76. The term “fudging” in our experience usually is applied to instances in which an analyst alters
empirical data with the purpose of causing them to produce a desired result when viewed through the
lens of a particular method of analysis.  Here, we use the term to denote the selection of a method for
analysis that is driven by consideration of the result it produces.
77. As in the case of cherrypicking, fudging is rarely condemned in the reported cases because, by
definition, it is hard to detect.  A few courts, however, have displayed sensitivity to the general prob-
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As a less transparent example, consider the employer alleged to pay its fe-
male employees less than its male employees.  A common way of exploring
such allegations, after doing some simple average pay comparisons, is through
the use of regression analysis.  Regressions constitute a large class of models in
most circumstances of this type, so the analyst has great latitude in selecting the
particular one or ones on which to rely.  An analyst can, in principle, run hun-
dreds or even thousands of different models using the same underlying data in
search of that one model most flattering to his client.78
Virtually all regression models are computed using general purpose, com-
mercially available software.  Each computation generates a standard set of p-
values that describe various aspects of the application of that model to the data
at hand, but none of these p-values depends in any way on or takes any account
of the other regression models that may have been run and examined by this
analyst using the same data.  In effect, the p-values produced by standard re-
gression software are all based on the presumption that this is the first time the
analyst has examined these data using any model.  Consequently, when the
analyst runs ten different regression models on the same database and then re-
lies on the one that produces the most helpful p-value, that p-value does not re-
liably perform its function of reflecting the likelihood of the chance occurrence
of comparable results.79
The first of the above two examples (involving the self-serving choice of an
age cut-off) is so transparent that it is likely that both the litigants and the trier
of fact will be cognizant of the inappropriateness of both p-values.  As a result,
the trier of fact will discount them both and deal with the case on other
grounds.  The second of the two examples, however, is not so easily shrugged
off.  The clever attorney can hire one analyst to run dozens or perhaps even
hundreds of regressions in search of the one with the most acceptable p-values,
and then hire a fresh analyst for the sole purpose of “discovering” that one re-
gression.80  If all goes well, the new analyst, unaware of the previous exploratory
lem. The hypothetical in the text resembles the facts of Adams v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 2 F.
Supp. 2d 1077, 1100-03 (S.D. Ind. 1998), where a statistician both selected data and shaped his analysis
of alleged age discrimination in a way that struck the court as result-driven.  See also Munoz v. Orr, 200
F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding the statistician’s evidence inadmissible because he “began his
analysis with the assumption that [defendant’s] promotion system discriminated against Hispanic
males,” and then selectively excluded variables and modes of analysis); Allard v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co.,
1 F. Supp. 2d 898, 905-07 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (companion case to Adams; criticizing the Adams expert for
allowing the client to influence the framing of research questions and analysis).
78. This problem was identified a generation ago.  See Michael O. Finkelstein, Regression Models
in Administrative Proceedings, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1442, 1449 n.27 (1973).  Finkelstein described the
problem as “seldom discussed,” a term that is equally apt today.  He proposed a set of four “protocols”
to address a number of latent problems with regression models of economic data.  To our knowledge,
however, his protocols have never been cited by a federal court.  See infra notes 102-103 and accompa-
nying text.
79. For a discussion of the application of a series of regression models to the same data, see
EDWARD E. LEAMER, SPECIFICATION SEARCHES: AD HOC INFERENCE WITH NONEXPERIMENTAL
DATA 87-120 (1978).
80. The new analyst might be instructed as follows: “Dr. Expert, we think that starting pay prop-
erly depends on level of education and years of prior experience, and not gender.  We have prepared
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work and given a narrowly tailored task, produces the desired regression, or
one much like it, on the first try.  He can then testify truthfully that, to him, the
p-values for that regression are exactly what they purport to be.
C. Finding the Hidden Analyses: The Inadequacy of Current Discovery Rules
The foregoing “cherrypicking” and “fudging” examples are variations of
what Posner calls “witness shopping.”81  If the scheme is properly managed, no
single analyst has necessarily done anything wrong or, more to the point, unsci-
entific.  Indeed, one of the examples of cherrypicking, the R2-5 analysis, ap-
pears to meet the Salk vaccine gold standard.  Likewise, each of the other ex-
amples reports an ostensibly respectable p-value.  Thus, from the Daubert
perspective, there seems to be no basis to exclude any of them.
Yet when the full story is known, each analysis taken alone gives a distorted
answer to the ultimate question of legal interest: respectively, whether R2-5 is
more effective than aspirin, or whether the employer discriminated.  These di-
lemmas are more difficult to sort out than those discussed in Parts II-IV of the
paper.  They share with those earlier problems the requirement of a sophisti-
cated understanding of the scientific method and the meaning of p-values, but
add the problem of hidden evidence.  This is because, under current law, it is far
from certain that either an adversary or the court has any means to discover the
sorts of deceptions we have described.82
As Posner’s complaint implies, there is no definitive requirement that a
party disclose the identities of all the experts it has consulted.83  The basic expert
discovery rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26(b)(4), as amended
in 1993, creates two categories of experts.  In the first category, “any person
who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial”
this database containing that sort of information.  Could you please have a look at this and let us know
what you think?  We very much need your help, and have been awed by your prior work in this
area . . . .”  See Allard, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (stating that the expert “explained his procedures by stat-
ing that he used information provided by the plaintiffs’ counsel about the characteristics of the
workforce he studied”).
81. See Posner, supra note 71.
82. The analysis that follows in the text demonstrates the lack of any discovery right that could be
used to uncover such deceptions.  Some lawyers who have commented on this paper, however, have
suggested that there often may be practical opportunities for detection.  For example, in at least some
cases, lawyers for the opposing parties may agree to full disclosure of all experts, testifying and non-
testifying.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (requiring parties to meet to discuss discovery matters).  Trial
judges also have considerable authority to customize discovery procedures in individual cases under
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b), (c) & (e).  Local rules sometimes underscore the court’s authority, see, e.g.,
E.D.N.C. R. 23.07(c) (involving the court in discovery planning), but these rules usually simply restate
the rights and duties created by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See, e.g., D.S.C. R. 26(b)(4)(A)
(requiring disclosure of testifying experts); E.D. Va. R. 26(D) (incorporating the mandatory disclosure
obligations of Federal Rules).  Our own experience, confirmed by informal discussions with lawyers
throughout the country, is that discovery of non-testifying experts is very rarely agreed to, and even
more rarely ordered.  The cases in which it does occur are almost always large and closely managed
ones.
83. See Stephen D. Easton, Ammunition for the Shoot-Out With the Hired Gun’s Hired Gun: A
Proposal for Full Expert Witness Disclosure, 32 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 465 (2000).
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can be deposed as a matter of right.84  Depending on when a lawyer is called
upon to decide which experts may be presented at trial, it is possible to shield
the “wrong answer” experts from deposition.  If, for example, the demand for
depositions of testifying experts is made after multiple analyses have been com-
pleted, the responding lawyer will already have taken those who produced un-
helpful results out of the testifying category and will not need to produce them.
In the second category is any “expert who has been retained or specially
employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for
trial.”85  An expert in this category can be subject to interrogatories or a deposi-
tion, but “only as provided in Rule 35(b) [which deals with court-ordered physi-
cal and mental examinations] or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances
under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or
opinions on the same subject by other means.”86  Note that the latter provision
defines “exceptional circumstances” in terms of the impracticability of obtain-
ing other opinions on the same subject;87 it makes no reference to the adversary’s
need to examine alternative studies.  With the possible exception of the R2-5
example, in each of the hypothetical cases described in this section, it is entirely
practicable for the opposing party to obtain opinions on the same subject.88
Thus, Rule 26(b)(4) does not provide access to hidden and obviously non-
testifying experts—nor even a duty to disclose their identities.89
A related question is whether the deposition of the testifying expert—the
one who found the “right” p-value—would inevitably lead to the discovery of
the hidden analyses.  This discovery would not occur, because the client or law-
yer hires separate analysts until the desired result is reached, and then walls the
analysts off from each other.
Another possible source of discovery of the hidden analyses is the manda-
tory disclosure provisions that were added to Rule 26(a) in 1993.90  At least
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
85. Id. 26(b)(4)(B).  The apparent purpose of this special retention language is to distinguish an
expert witness from a fact witness, such as a treating physician who also happens to be an expert.  See
Id. 26(b)(4) advisory committee’s notes; cf. Patel v. Gayes, 984 F.2d 214, 218 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
that a physician is a mere fact witness if his opinions are based solely on treatment, but becomes an ex-
pert if opinions are also based on other sources); Shapardon v. West Beach Estates, 172 F.R.D. 415, 417
(D. Haw. 1997) (same).
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
87. See, e.g., Queen’s Univ. at Kingston v. Kinedyne Corp., 161 F.R.D. 443, 447-48 (D. Kan. 1995);
Santos v. Rando Mach. Corp., 151 F.R.D. 19, 21-22 (D.R.I. 1993).
88. Assume, for example, false advertising litigation over the claim that R2-5 was more effective
than aspirin.  It might be quite impracticable for the opposing party—the FTC, perhaps—to conduct
the studies necessary to obtain opinions on the subject.  Here, conceivably, a court might allow discov-
ery of the conclusions reached by the non-testifying experts.  In each of the other cases, however, there
is no reason why an opposing party could not obtain opinions on the questions addressed in the “hid-
den” studies.
89. See Queen’s Univ., 161 F.R.D. at 447; Ager v. Jane Stormont Hosp., 622 F.2d 496, 500-01 (10th
Cir. 1980).
90. As a preliminary matter, note that about half the district courts opted out of the mandatory
disclosure rule, but the right to opt out has been abrogated by the 2000 amendment to the Federal
Rules.
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ninety days before trial,91 each party must disclose “the identity of any person
who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence [the expert rules].”92  In the case of an expert who is
retained or specially employed, or an employee of a party who regularly gives
expert testimony, the disclosure must also include a written report that contains:
(1) a complete statement of opinions; (2) the reasons for such opinions; (3) “the
data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions”;
(4) the exhibits the witness will use; and (5) the witness’s qualifications and
compensation.93
Even this apparently all-encompassing disclosure, however, is unlikely to
capture the hidden analyses we have described.94  The party need only disclose
those experts who are expected to testify.  Unless the court overrides the
ninety-day rule and orders the mandatory disclosures very early in the case, the
“wrong” analyses will have been identified and buried well before Rule 26(a)(2)
ever comes into play.  Moreover, the requirement that the expert’s report in-
clude a complete statement of opinions, reasons, and underlying information is
also likely to be unavailing, since the expert who survives to testify will have no
knowledge of those who were discarded along the way.95
91. The 90-day rule may be modified by order of court or stipulation.  See FED. R. CIV. P.
26(a)(2)(c).  In addition, expert evidence intended solely to contradict or rebut the other side’s evi-
dence need not be disclosed until 30 days after the opposition’s disclosure.  See id.
92. Id. 26(a)(2)(A).
93. Id. 26(a)(2)(B); see also Schwarzer & Cecil, supra note 14, at 49-50 (reviewing mandatory ex-
pert disclosure).
94. THE MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD (1995) (“MCL”), advocates that courts or-
der even more extensive mandatory expert discovery early in employment discrimination cases, in-
cluding an exchange of statistical databases.  See id. § 33.53.  However, nothing recommended in the
MCL addresses the specific problems we have identified.  Cf. id. § 21.48 (discussing the limited nature
of discovery available against “consulting” but non-testifying experts).
95. Logically, the work of discarded experts would fit within the work product doctrine.  Originat-
ing in the Supreme Court’s 1947 decision in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), and codified since
1970 in Rule 26(b)(3), the doctrine confers presumptive immunity on “documents and tangible
things . . . [otherwise discoverable] prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party [or a party’s lawyer].”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).  This immunity can be overcome only upon a
showing “that the party seeking discovery has a substantial need of the materials in the preparation of
the party’s case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent
of the materials by other means.”  Id.  If the court orders disclosure, it must “protect against disclosure
of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representa-
tive.”  Id.  There have been a number of inconsistent decisions on the question of whether attorney
work product that is shown to an expert is discoverable.  See Easton, supra note 83, at 528-36.  How-
ever, with respect to an expert’s own work, it is clear from the preamble of Rule 26(b)(3) (“Subject to
the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) . . .”), the 1970 Advisory Committee notes to Rule 26(b)(3) (charac-
terizing as “ill-considered” the cases that sought to bring experts within the work product doctrine),
and the case law that Rule 26(b)(4) is the exclusive vehicle for discovery.  See e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 533, 536-37 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Beverage Mktg. Corp. v. Ogilvy &
Mather Direct Response, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 1013, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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VI
CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Three points should now be clear.  First, the subtleties of the scientific
method in general, and statistical inference in particular, can make discernment
of the scientific method difficult, even in cases of full disclosure of all available
analyses.  Second, the process of analysis shopping can result in a deceptive
analysis being presented by an honest and scientifically scrupulous expert wit-
ness.  Third, the current rules of discovery facilitate the concealment of many
such deceptions.
While the law can do little, if anything, to make the scientific method more
transparent, it can take some fairly modest steps to ensure that the parties and
the gatekeeping trial judge have all of the relevant information in front of them.
In our judgment, there is only one way to avoid the kinds of abuses of scientific
evidence that we have been discussing:  All scientific work commissioned by
any party must be fully discoverable, regardless of whether it is used at trial.
Some may argue that this approach undercuts the fundamental premises of the
adversary system—“that each side’s informal evaluation of its case should be
protected, that each side should be encouraged to prepare independently, and
that one side should not automatically have the benefit of the detailed prepara-
tory work of the other side.”96  But the adversary principle has never been ab-
solute and has often yielded to concerns about justice.
Expert discovery is itself a compromise.  Discovery of experts as of right was
not available until 1970, when Rule 26(b)(4) was amended to allow an inter-
rogatory seeking the identities of testifying experts and the substance and bases
of their opinions.97  The change was made in response to the concern that “a
prohibition against discovery of information held by expert witnesses produces
in acute form the very evils that discovery has been created to prevent,” espe-
cially shooting-in-the-dark cross-examination.98  The rule remains a work in
progress.  By 1993, it had become clear that the “expert interrogatory” allowed
by the 1970 amendment was inadequate to the task, and the right to depose tes-
tifying experts was added, “conforming the norm stated in the rule to the actual
practice followed in most courts.”99  The advent of mandatory disclosure of testi-
fying expert reports and other matters, also in 1993, came in the face of vigorous
opposition from adversary purists.100  As in the case of previous changes, the
objections were overcome by the desire to make litigation more efficient, more
rational, and less expensive.101  In the present situation, the adversary principle
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes to 1970 amend.
97. See id. 26(b)(4) advisory committee’s notes.
98. Id.
99. Id. 26(b) advisory committee’s notes.
100. See, e.g., Supreme Court of the United States, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 146 F.R.D. 507, 510-12 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting from Court’s promulgation of mandatory
disclosure rules).
101. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) advisory committee’s notes.
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should yield once again—this time to the very real threat of deceptive “science”
slipping through the Daubert net.
As this brief history suggests, demands for reform in expert disclosure are
nothing new.  In addition to the incremental work of the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, legal academics have regularly proposed more fundamental
changes.  In 1973, Michael Finkelstein proposed a set of procedural reforms
that he called “protocols.”102  These reforms were directed specifically at the use
of statistical evidence in administrative proceedings.  He suggested, for exam-
ple, that the decisionmaker make a preliminary determination of the data that
should be analyzed and that a party objecting to an opponent’s statistical model
quantify the objection and advance a superior alternative model.  While Finkel-
stein’s article talks specifically about ratemaking proceedings and econometric
regression models, his protocols are readily adaptable to statistical analyses in a
wide variety of cases.  Requiring the decisionmaker to specify the relevant data
would begin to address some of the problems we have raised.  Yet we have
been unable to find a single case that has adopted any part of his recommenda-
tions.103
More recently, in 1991, Samuel Gross wrote a lengthy and thoughtful com-
mentary on the state of expert evidence.104  According to Gross, the need for
special procedural treatment of experts derives from the fact that “expert in-
formation is categorically different from other types of information that we use
in litigation, and that the functions of expert witnesses are fundamentally dif-
ferent from those of other people who provide information in court.”105  Gross
proposed “minor changes” that trial judges already had the authority to impose.
Among these “minor” changes were presenting all expert testimony at the same
time; permitting experts to question each other; requiring that experts exchange
reports and meet face-to-face for an “unmediated discussion” before trial; and
ordering opposing experts to produce a joint report that defines key terms, lists
points of agreement and disagreement, and jointly addresses such issues as the
identification of qualified non-partisan experts.106  Although the pre-trial ex-
change of expert reports has become part of Rule 26(a)’s mandatory disclo-
sures, Gross’s other suggestions, like Finkelstein’s, have been ignored by the
courts.107
102. See Finkelstein, supra note 78.
103. Although it does not cite his work, the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION adopts the gen-
eral thrust of Finkelstein’s protocols in its recommendations for dealing with complex statistical evi-
dence.  See supra note 78.
104. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113 (1991).
105. Id. at 1208.
106. See id. at 1211-13.  Gross also advocated a number of other changes that he characterized as
“major,” including the elimination of oral testimony by experts, the elimination of juries, and the re-
striction of expert testimony to court-appointed neutrals.  See id. at 1213-30.
107. A LEXIS search of both state and federal databases revealed a single citation to Gross’s article,
on the ancillary point of how hard it is to cross-examine experts.  See State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 748
(Conn. 1997).
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This past summer, Stephen Easton published yet another exhaustive review
of the problems of expert discovery and testimony.108  He, too, offered a set of
proposed reforms.  The centerpiece of his proposal was a substantial addition to
the mandatory disclosure provisions of Rule 26(a).109  Specifically, he argued
that experts retained to give testimony should be required to disclose all docu-
ments, data compilations, and tangible things furnished to them by a party or a
lawyer, and the contents of all communications between them and a party or a
lawyer.110  Easton’s amendment would certainly, as he suggests, make cross-
examination better informed.111  Furthermore, it would address one of the
problems we have identified, that of counsel giving leading instructions to the
expert.  It would not, however, assist counsel and the courts in uncovering ques-
tions that were never asked, analyses that were left undone, or unfavorable re-
sults from now non-testifying experts who had been dispatched to the eviden-
tiary graveyard.  It is too early to tell whether Easton’s proposal will commend
itself to the courts and the rules authorities.
Despite the lack of response to these earlier efforts, we will argue nonethe-
less for a simple but significant revision of Rule 26(b)(4)(B).  Initially, we
wanted to amend that paragraph quite radically, as follows:
(B) A party may also, through interrogatories or deposition, discover the identity of,
as well as facts known or opinions held by, any expert retained, specially employed, or
consulted by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who
is not expected to be called as a witness at trial.
Whereas the present paragraph (B) requires a showing of “exceptional cir-
cumstances” to discover the work of a non-testifying expert, our initial idea was
to create an entitlement.  And whereas the present rule limits even this court-
ordered discovery to experts retained or specially employed, our proposed dis-
covery as of right would have extended to the broader category of all those who
had been consulted in any manner.  Finally, our proposal would have given an
explicit affirmative answer to a question not dealt with at all by the present dis-
covery rules: whether a party can be forced to identify its non-testifying experts.
As we presented this proposal at two pre-publication conferences,112 we ar-
gued for it on the basis of its obvious capability to prevent the sorts of abuses
we have discussed above.  More generally, we argued that this proposal would
aid trial judges in the discernment of the scientific method.  We remain con-
vinced of that capability.  The principal value of this radical approach is that it
would force scientists appearing in court to behave like scientists.  Science, like
108. See Easton, supra note 83.
109. See id. at 544-49.
110. See id. at 545-49.
111. See id. at 550.
112. The first was a conference on science and the law at Seton Hall University School of Law in
Newark, New Jersey, on October 27, 2000, which involved practicing lawyers, judges, and scholars.  The
second was the editorial conference for this volume, held at Duke University School of Law on No-
vember 10-11, 2000.  At the latter conference, we benefited especially from the always-perceptive
comments of Duke professor Francis McGovern, who has vast experience managing and mediating
complex scientific evidence cases for courts throughout the country.
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the law, is an adversarial process, with an approximation of the truth emerging
from a dialectic.113  Science differs from the law, however, in that it is open, at
least with respect to its methods, procedures, and data.114  Whereas the law falls
into the category—with sausages and, now, elections—of things that one does
not want to watch being made, the essence of science is that one does watch it.
As Douglas Crawford-Brown has pointed out elsewhere in this syposium, sci-
ence is best defined by its practice.115  Our initial, radical proposal had the pre-
eminent virtue of bringing that practice to the courtroom.
At the two conferences, the proposal was subjected to withering criticism
from several lawyers in attendance.  Much of this critique seemed little more
than defense of the status quo for its own sake.  Some attacked our initial pro-
posal solely because it went directly against the grain of the adversarial princi-
ple that each side should do its own work.  Our response to this point is that
separating the use of science from its abuse is difficult enough without having to
contend with deceptive gamesmanship.  Thus, this is simply another instance in
which adversarial purity must yield to the interests of justice.  Others thought
that full disclosure would disproportionately disadvantage either plaintiffs or
defendants—with the choice strongly correlated with the commentator’s own
practice background.  But we think that the only parties who are systematically
disadvantaged by full disclosure are those who rely on bad science.  We have no
solicitude for them, be they plaintiffs or defendants.  Some of these same people
also complained about the possible proliferation of depositions that our pro-
posal portended.  While this is a valid point, the answer depends on comparing
the cost of expanded discovery to the benefit of complete disclosure in individ-
ual cases; on balance, we did not judge this problem to be a fatal flaw.116
Another element of the critique was more telling, however.  Several plain-
tiffs’ lawyers remarked that, at the outset of a personal injury or medical mal-
practice case, they routinely had a brief and informal conversation with a re-
spected doctor of their acquaintance.  This discussion came immediately after
the initial conference with the client; its purpose was to help the lawyer decide
whether to take the case and begin formal consultations with prospective testi-
fying experts.  Although we heard only from the plaintiffs’ bar, it is plausible
that similar conversations occur on the defense side for the purpose of making
113. See Goodstein, supra note 11, at 74.
114. See id. at 78-79.
115. See Douglas Crawford-Brown, Scientific Models of Human Health Risk Analysis in Legal and
Policy Decisions, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (Autumn 2001).
116. It was also suggested that judges can avoid the kinds of problems we have raised by appointing
their own experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 706.  Projects such as the Duke Private Adjudication
Center’s Registry of Independent Scientific and Technical Advisors have made it easier for courts to
identify such experts.  See Stephen Breyer, Introduction to REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE, supra note 11, at 7-8.  Nonetheless, all the available evidence continues to indicate that
courts almost never use Rule 706.  See Note, Improving Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and
Scientific Evidence, 110 HARV. L. REV. 941, 947 n.47 (1997) (stating that 80% of judges in the survey
had never used a court-appointed expert); Schwarzer & Cecil, supra note 14, at 61 (explaining that, ac-
cording to judges interviewed, such appointments are “infrequent”).  Moreover, even a neutral expert
will be unlikely to detect deceptive science if the critical evidence remains hidden.
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an initial judgment about possible liability.  These discussions are not necessar-
ily limited to personal injury cases and might occur in any case hinging on ex-
pert advice.
Our interlocutors stressed two points:  These conversations serve the inter-
ests of justice, and they could never take place if the experts being consulted
thought that they might be subject to discovery or even identification.  We were
persuaded on both points.  With respect to the first, there can be no doubt that
the conversations described have the capacity to deter frivolous suits with at-
tendant saving in public and private resources.  On occasion, they may also ex-
pedite the settlement of cases that do have merit.  The validity of the second
point is self-evident.
As a consequence of this dialogue, we propose the following as a revised
version of Rule 26(b)(4)(B):
A party may, through interrogatories, discover the identity of, as well as facts known
or opinions held by, any expert who has been retained or specially employed by an-
other party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected
to be called as a witness at trial.  Further discovery of such experts, including deposi-
tions, may be taken only by leave of court, which shall be granted when the interests
of justice so require.  Discovery of experts consulted by another party but neither re-
tained nor specially employed may be taken only by leave of court upon a showing of
exceptional circumstances under which a fair trial on the merits may not be had with-
out such discovery.
The three sentences of this paragraph seek to accomplish three different
objectives.  First, the interrogatory provision creates a preliminary entitlement
to discover the identities and opinions of all experts who have been “retained or
specially employed”117 but will not testify.  The interrogatory approach is the
same as that followed with respect to testifying experts between 1970 and
1993.118  We chose it to permit an adversary to learn of the existence and basic
function of “hidden” experts without inviting an explosion of fishing-expedition
depositions.
The second sentence requires a court order to depose a specially retained
but non-testifying expert, as the current rule provides.  However, whereas cur-
rent Rule 26(b)(4)(B) requires a showing of “exceptional circumstances” in-
volving the impracticability of getting comparable opinions from other sources,
we propose a more generous “interests of justice” criterion.119  The intent of the
language is that courts allow further discovery when it appears calculated to ex-
pose the kinds of problem we have reviewed.
Finally, the third sentence requires leave of court before any discovery may
be conducted against casually consulted experts.  In this case, the party seeking
such discovery must convince the court that the circumstances are so excep-
117. This phrase is currently used in Rule 26(b)(4)(B).
118. Prior to 1970, there was no discovery as of right against experts.  The 1970 amendments to Rule
26(b)(4) introduced the testifying expert interrogatory.  The current right to depose testifying experts
was created by the 1993 amendments.
119. This language is borrowed from a very different context: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a),
which deals with amendments to pleadings.
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tional that a fair trial would otherwise be impossible.  The intent of this ap-
proach is twofold.  On the one hand, it protects those doctors and other infor-
mal experts who perform a valuable screening function.  On the other, it allows
for the possibility of discovery against more substantial hidden experts who are
being disingenuously characterized as non-specially retained.  Therefore, a
party who proceeds through the discovery permitted under the first two sen-
tences and learns of the existence of, for example, a statistician performing
“casual” parallel analyses has the opportunity to persuade a court that further
discovery is warranted.
Even this refined proposal does not avoid the fundamental objection that it
violates the adversary principle by allowing one party to eavesdrop, as it were,
on the other’s trial preparation efforts, albeit in a balanced and symmetrical
way.  We see no less drastic alternative, however, if the actual and potential dis-
tortions of science we have chronicled are to be exposed.  In the end, one must
choose between two values: the sanctity of the adversarial process versus the
openness that is a hallmark of science.  Were the adversary principle utterly
immutable, there would be no expert discovery at all—or any discovery, for that
matter.  In our judgment, it is time for the adversary principle to yield once
again to the interests of fair and rational adjudication.
